An authorization legitimate earlier is reused after standing has changed.
WEDGE's own documented scope names replay and substitution detection directly. This scenario illustrates that concept through a bounded synthetic example.
No real external authorization token, pipeline, or identity-provider integration is connected here. This does not claim a live token was intercepted.
A time-boxed elevated-compute authorization, legitimate when issued, is reused by an automated pipeline after the researcher's role changed and the grant's window closed.
The situation
A researcher received a time-boxed elevated-compute grant for one specific experiment. An automated pipeline, still holding the same authorization token, attempts to reuse it weeks later.
What the model / agent knows
- The original authorization token.
- The compute job it wants to run.
- Nothing about whether the token's underlying conditions still hold — that check happens independently of what the pipeline itself knows or assumes.
What it wants to do
Reuse the held token to run an elevated-compute job.
- Actor
- Researcher (synthetic), via automated pipeline
- Requested action
- Reuse the held token to run an elevated-compute job
- Target / system
- Elevated-compute cluster
- Scope
- One specific experiment (as originally issued)
- Context
- Token holding is not the same as its conditions still being true; standing is re-derived, not assumed
- Current permission
- —
What capability it can access
- Elevated-compute cluster
- Reachable using the held token
- Original grant
- Existed — issued for one specific experiment
Who has authority?
The grant's authority was real when issued. Whether it is still current is a separate, independently re-checked question — holding a token is not the same as the token's conditions still being true.
What Genesis checks
- Whether the authorization's time window still holds.
- Whether the principal's role has changed since issuance.
- Whether the grant has since been revoked.
- Current standing is re-derived from these, never assumed from the token's mere existence.
- Principal
- Researcher (synthetic), via automated pipeline
- Authorization existed
- Yes — issued for one specific experiment
- Scope
- One specific experiment (as originally issued)
- Time window
- Within original window
- Role since issuance
- Unchanged
- Revocation state
- Not revoked
- Current standing
- Established
Authorization existed, and current standing is established: time window holds, role is unchanged, and the grant has not been revoked.
What happens next
Genesis would evaluate every reuse of a held authorization against its current conditions, not its original issuance alone. If any single condition — window, role, revocation — no longer holds, the demonstrated consequence boundary returns a refusal, not a silent pass-through.
Inspect the evidence
See the reasoning
"Authorization existed" and "current standing is established" are shown as two separate facts throughout — reusing this scenario's controls, you can hold the first true while making the second false, which is exactly the replay condition this pain point is about.
Explore the architecture
Genesis components involved: